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REMOVAL OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS FROM FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION TO A TRADE COURT: A
REPLY TO MR. KINTNER

Raoul Berger*

N

OT long ago,

Attorney General Rogers stated that, "The entire
field of administrative law and of Government regulation
may require a searching re-examination of some of the premises on
which we have based our conclusions."1 What lifts this utterance
to the level of "man bites dog" is that the Attorney General almost
alone among federal administrators does not insist that the administrative process, in major outline, is forever frozen. The orthodox
administrative view is exemplified by Mr. Earl W. Kintner's (formerly General Counsel and now Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission) numerous strictures upon the American Bar Association proposal that the judicial functions of the Federal Trade Commission be transferred to a Trade Court. To his alarmed gaze,
this "caps" "The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process."2
The ABA proposal grew out of a "searching re-examination,"
earlier undertaken by the Hoover Commission.3 "Without
doubt," said Professor Jaffe in 1956, "the most acute problem of
our administrative system is created by the so-called combination
• Member, Illinois and District of Columbia bars; chairman of the ABA Special
Committee on Special Courts. - Ed.
1 Speech at the 25th anniversary banquet of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Washington, D.C., Oct. 8, 1959, reported in the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 9, 1959. Mr.
Kintner supplies for Dean Landis' "description of the current crisis" the label "The Crisis
of Re-evaluation." Kintner, Federal Administrative Law in the Decade of the Sixties,
Statement Before Federal Bar Association, Chicago, Sept. 16, 1960, p. 4 (hereinafter cited
Kintner, Fed. Ad. Law).
2 Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply To Mr. Hector, 69 YALE L.J. 965, 966 (1960) (hereinafter cited Kintner, Current Ordeal.) The proposal for an Article III court is now embodied in S. 1275, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. For details,
see Kintner, The Trade Court Proposal: An Examination of Some Possible Defects, 44
A.B.A.J. 441 (1958) (hereinafter cited Kintner, Trade Court Proposal). For additional
criticisms, see Kintner, The Trade Court, the ABA, the Lawyer and the Public Interest,
Proceedings, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Washington, D.C., April 4-5, 1957, p. 72
(hereinafter cited Kintner, Trade Court and ABA); Kintner, A Government Lawyer Comments on the Davis Treatise, 43 MINN. L. REv. 620, 629 (1959) (hereinafter cited Kintner
on Davis); Hearings Before Harris Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Nov. 18, 1958, p. 43 (hereinafter cited Harris Hearings).
3 Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(1955).
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of prosecuting and adjudicating functions within one agency." 4 It
remains disquieting that the prosecutor who files a charge of law
violation should be permitted to adjudicate the charge}'
Not content with challenging the validity of the arguments in
favor of the ABA proposal, Mr. Kintner impugns the motives of
its architects, charging that the Trade Court advocates "would
destroy the Federal Trade Commission and possibly scuttle the
entire administrative process...." 6 He views this as part of what
he terms the "New Criticism," i.e., those who were opposed to
governmental regulation, having lost the "battle," shift their
ground to "reforms" that "would abolish regulation."7 For this,
Mr. Kintner cites Justice Jackson, then Solicitor General:
"Those who dislike such activities of the Government as regulation of the utility holding companies, of labor relations, or
of the marketing of securities, rightly conceive that if they can
destroy the administrative tribunal which enforces regulation,
they would destroy the whole plan of regulation itself.''8
4 Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273, 1278 (1955) hereinafter
cited Jaffe, Basic Issues). It needs remembering that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who
created the bulk of the administrative agencies, said in 1937: "There is a conflict of prin•
ciple involved in their make-up and functions .••• They are vested with duties of admin•
istration • • • and at the same time they are given important judicial work. • • • The
evils resulting from this confusion of principles are insidious and far-reaching. • • •
Pressures and influences properly enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating
and administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate
private rights. But the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these subversive
influences impossible. Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve both as prosecutors
and as judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence
in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the
suspicion of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the Commission, in
the role of prosecutor, presented to itself." Quoted, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
206 (1941).
For a recent clinical report to the same effect, see Hector, Problems of the CAB and
the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960) (hereinafter cited Hector
Memorandum).
5 Recently the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, in Report No. 2031, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., June 29, 1960 (hereinafter cited Veterans Affairs Report), noting (at p. 2) that
Veterans Affairs "in all instances judges the claim which it is also defending itself against,"
recommended establishment of a Court of Veterans Appeals, saying (at p. 5), "the importance of maintaining tribunals for the impartial adjudication of the rights of citizens
cannot be too strongly emphasized.•.•"
6 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 81. He has expressed the belief that
"dismantling the administrative process •.• by removing the quasi-judicial functions from
the administrative agencies across the board •.. really is the intention of those proposals
emanating from the American Bar Association•.• .'' Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at
43. (Emphasis added.) He asks the rhetorical question, "Is this trade proposal merely an
opening wedge in a campaign for ultimate destruction of the entire administrative process?"
Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 95. (Emphasis added.) Such remarks
recall Communist rejection of "deviationism" from the "party line" as heretical.
7 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 967, 965.
8 Kintner on Davis, supra note 2, at 629 (emphasis added), quoting Jackson, The Administrative Process, 5 J. Soc. PHIL. 143, 146-47 (1940). Referring to the ABA proposal,
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Undoubtedly Jackson's remarks had considerable force in 1940,
the time of their utterance. It cannot be gainsaid that an important segment of the ABA was opposed to much of the New
Deal's socio-economic program,9 and to its enforcement by an
"alphabet soup" of new agencies. But while the ABA "had engaged originally in a somewhat drastic attack on the administrative
process as a whole, ... it, along with the New Dealers,10 learned a
great deal from the long battle for the APA." 11 It would be an
impractical if not a foolhardy lawyer who would today seek, for
example, repeal of the National Labor Relations Act, the Securities
Act, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act. Faith in the
permanence of these New Deal innovations is nourished by the
militant zeal with which Republicans, such as Mr. Kintner, are
now crusading to safeguard the once suspect New Deal agencies
from the touch of desecrating hands.
he goes on to say that it has been demonstrated that "there is a close relationship between
Mr. Justice Jackson's analysis in 1940 [Jackson, J., took his seat on October 6, 1941] and
the American Bar Association action in 1956 with the resulting trade court bill in the
present Congress •••. The trade court bill, if adopted, might very well aid, as Mr. Justice
Jackson suggested, in destroying effective trade regulation." Id. at 630.
o "The tremendous proliferation of administrative power in the 1920's, reaching its
zenith in the first few years of the New Deal, alarmed the lawyer community. Basically,
no doubt, it was the substance of the granted powers with their threat to the status quo
which was disturbing." Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1273.
10 "[M]any who in the mid-thirties were cheering the newly created agencies of the
New Deal .•. believed that some inner current ineluctably made the administrative agency
an instrument of social and economic progressivism ...•"
"By and large the liberals believed that administrators could be relied upon for wise
and just decisions, and that, as a corollary they should as far as possible be free from
judicial supervisfon that might rigidify administrative procedures or supplant the informed
administrative conclusions." GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL REs'rn.AINT
5, 8 (1956).
After 1946, "within the academic groves could be heard mutterings that perhaps the
courts were abdicating their responsibilities, and should stand readier than in the past to
review administrative acts, while diminishing their deference to the supposed administrative
expertness. Id. at II. (Emphasis added.)
The shift took place as administrative action became concerned with individual rights,
i.e., the "security," deportation, passport cases, etc., as differentiated from the earlier general economic questions. Id. at 19 et seq. Professor Gellhorn notes that in consequence
"within this brief span of [25] years the defenders and detractors of the administrative
process have all but exchanged roles." Id. at 4. l\fany "who a few years ago discovered the
agencies as vehicles of social reconstruction now regard them as positive impediments."
Jaffe, Review of Davis Administrative Law Treatise, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1638 (1960) (hereinafter cited Jaffe on Davis).
And there are tried "liberals" who now prefer judges to administrators, GELLHORN,
supra at 22; Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv. 436, 473-74 (1954).
11 Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1273. See also address, James M. Landis, "The
Administrative Process -The Third Decade," before ABA, Section of Administrative Law,
Aug. 29, 1960, Washington, D.C., p. 5
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Having garbed those who are "re-examining" the administrative process with the robes of the "New Criticism," Mr. Kintner
wraps himself in the mantle of "pragmatism," as opposed to the
"rigid conceptualism" on which "the proposal for an administrative court is bottomed."12 But what is "pragmatism" to one may
appear like an "abstraction" to another: the Kintnerian School opposes "to the 'abstraction' of separation of powers ... what is itself
an abstraction ... that policy making and adjudication are indissolubly married. " 13 Because the union of prosecution and adjudication was once experimental-and therefore "pragmatic," it
does not follow that it is not now equally pragmatic to inquire
whether the experiment "works," the touchstone of "pragmatism."
Otherwise, "pragmatism" would be exhausted by its first exercise,
mistaken though it was, and the "radical experiments of yesterday
[would] become frozen into a new conservatism."14
It bears emphasizing that there is nothing sacrosanct about the
union of prosecuting and adjudicatory functions in one agency.
The union was not received on Mount Sinai; it is merely an experiment in government, and a comparatively recent departure at
that. Professor Jaffe reminds us that while the ICC had been given
power to adjudicate, initiation of prosecutions was ordinarily left
to private parties, and the emphasis was "less an attempt to fix
blame, than it was legislative," i.e., rule-making. The "more
obvious breach with the tradition [of separating adjudication from
prosecution] came with the Federal Trade Commission which was
authorized to initiate and try charges of unfair practices and other
violations of law...." 15 The combination of those functions, says
Professor Jaffe, is "a rather novel element of our administrative
law. It seems to have grown up without too much thought and
without sufficient awareness of its break with tradition."16 When
12 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 967, 965, 968.
13 Jaffe on Davis, supra note 10, at 1689.
14 Hector, The Regulatory Agencies and the Pragmatic

Approach, Sterling Lecture,
Yale Law School, April 19, 1960, p. 4, a delightful critique of the pre-emption by regulators
of the "pragmatic" approach. "It was the greatest of conservative writers [Edmund Burke]
who wrote: 'Nothing in progression can rest on its original plan. We may as well think of
rocking a grown man in the cradle of an infant." " BROGAN, THE PRICE OF REvoLUTION 267
(1951).
15 Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1279.
16 Id. at 1284. (Emphasis added.)
"Viewed in retrospect, even the Interstate Commerce Commission for all its lauded
precedent value was little more than a specialized court until the Transportation Act of
1920. It was concerned almost entirely with problems of discrimination and prejudice in
tariffs, and acted largely at the instigation of shippers. Its discretionary area of policy•
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the Attorney General's Committee came to study this union in
1940, it "suggested devices for mitigating its dangers,"17 chief of
which was an internal separation of functions. But, said that
committee, "Such internal separation by no means eliminates the
problem of combination of functions; but it alters, or if wisely
done may alter, its entire set and cast."18 Our starting point,
therefore, is a "rather novel" combination of prosecuting and adjudicating functions, which despite all efforts to "mitigate its
dangers" remains the "most acute problem of our administrative
system." A proposed solution of this problem deserves to be considered in an atmosphere at once free from invective1 9 and from
unreasoning worship of the status quo.
Being no less than Mr. Kintner a child of our "pragmatic" era,
I propose to inquire how the combination "works," to prefer
making or rule-making was really very little more than that of a body such as the Tax
Court today. After the railroads were returned to private ownership and the 1920 Act
was passed, the ICC spent most of its energies trying to save and restore an industry in
serious trouble rather than in curbing the forces of private acquisitiveness in the public
interest. It was a rescue, welfare operation more than it was a regulatory operation.
"The Federal Trade Commission has a similar history. The product of Wilsonian
democracy, it had scarcely got under way before the first World War temporarily overshadowed its work. During the 20s it accomplished little, and certainly did nothing to draw
on itself any massive, all-out attack from private business.
"So it was that despite all of this purported long history of independent regulatory
agencies, the real battle over them was postponed until the New Deal and the 1930s. This,
of course, when it came, was a battle over economic issues fought in Constitutional terms.
It was really the New Deal that was at stake, not the institution of the independent regulatory agency." Hector, The Regulatory Agencies and the Pragmatic Approach, Sterling
Lecture, Yale Law School, April 19, 1960, pp. 5-7.

Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1280.
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMI'ITEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 55 (1941).
Judge Friendly recently said, "I trust no one is so naive as to think the separation of
functions decreed by the Administrative Procedure Act really works." A Look at the
Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 429, 438 (1960).
19 It is strange that Mr. Kintner should accuse the ABA of an undercover assault on
the substantive scheme of regulation at the very time that the "new commission," installed
by President Eisenhower, for which Mr. Kintner has been an eloquent apologist [Kintner,
The Revitalized Federal Trade Commission: A Two-Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv.
114~ (1955) (hereinafter cited Kintner, Revitalized FTC)], has been charged in important
quarters with subverting the legislation confided to it for administration. Mr. Kintner
records (at 1143) that "Representative Wright Patman, redoubtable author of the Robinson-Patman Act, is 'terribly disturbed and greatly disappointed' with the 'new look' of the
Commission," and that the Commission is accused of being "at the forefront of 'subversive'
assaults on the Robinson-Patman Act." Id. at 1145. Also, that Senator Kefauver "is fearful
that the Commission is pursuing an ominous course 'which casts a threatening shadow over
the entire structure of the antitrust laws,' " and that "other members of Congress have
similar doubts." Id. at 1143-44. To be sure, Mr. Kintner has demonstrated to his own
satisfaction that such doubts are ill founded. But at least one unbiased observer, Professor
Jaffe, has said, "Recent appointees to the Trade Commission ••• appear to feel that they
have a mandate to pursue a more conservative course and to revise somewhat agency doctrine." Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 4, at 1288. (Emphasis added.)
17 Jaffe,

18 REPORT
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"practical considerations" to "neat theorems," 20 and, so far as
possible, to eschew "abstractions," if only because unthinking repetition has made some virtually impervious to the most hallowed
generalization.21 Mr. Kintner's numerous criticisms afford convenient pegs for discussion.

No Man Should Be Judge in His Own Cause
Lowell Mason, for eleven years a commissioner of the FTC,
states generally of administrative proceedings: "the men who sit
in judgment on you will be the men who originally complained
against you." 22 There is no need to expatiate at this late date upon
the value of the long-established principle that "No man should
be judge in his own cause."23 To some extent, the Board of Tax
Appeals, predecessor of the respected Tax Court, was "established
entirely outside the Treasury Department" to meet the demand
for "review by an impartia1 outside body."24 The success of both
the Board and Tax Court alone should absolve the ABA of making
an "untested utopian" proposal25 for the divorce of adjudication
from prosecution.
Mr. Kintner has no quarrel with the merits of the "slogan," "no
man should be a judge in his mm cause,"26 but concludes that "the
idea has no practical application to the Federal Trade Commission.
The five Commissioners derive no personal profit from proceedings before them." 27 But, as the Lord Sankey Committee stated,
"bias from strong and sincere conviction as to public policy may
operate as a more serious disqualification than pecuniary interest. " 28 On the other hand, there are those who believe, as Profes20 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 965.
21 We need to be reminded that a generalization

such as "separation of powers is an
:accumulation of wisdom generalizing a corpus of down-to-earth e.xperiences." Jaffe on
Davis, supra note 10, at 1639.
22 MASON, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 303 (1959).
23 For an excellent discussion of this principle and of separation of power considera·tions, see Clark, The Judicial Functions of the Federal Trade Commission Should Be Transferred to the District Courts, Proceedings, Antitrust Section, ABA, April 4, 1957, p. 51
(hereinafter cited Clark, Transfer of Functions).
24 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Part 2) 241,
:247. For a similar recent report respecting a Court of Veterans Appeals, see supra note 5.
25 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2 at 968.
26 How easily a cherished tenet is transformed into a "slogan" or mere catchword.
27 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 81.
28 REPORT OF THE CoMMITIEE ON MINISTER'S POWERS 78 (1932); see also infra, p. 228.
·Professor Cooper recently stated that "administrators, appointed to administer broad
policies of social or economic reform, entertain so strong a predilection for rapid imple-
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sor Davis testified, that "the same agency which determines policy
for particular subject matter through rule making, supervising,
and prosecuting, and otherwise, should also adjudicate the cases
that arise out of the application of that policy."29 "Judges," Professor Davis goes on to say, "are characteristically relatively neutral;
in fact, sometimes they are regarded as having biases which favor
the protection of previously existing property rights, as against the
furtherance of legislative or social objectives."30 "Unlike a judge
... an administrator often has an affirmative program to carry out;
he often has a mission, a purpose, a policy."31 Here we come to
grips with a major argument for administrative adjudication,
rooted in a belief that administrators are instruments of "social
and economic progressivism" and can be "relied upon for wise and
just decisions." 32
Now I am heartily for "social and economic progressivism" and
I entertain no doubt that in large part administrators are highminded. But my doubts whether we can lodge such great power
in administrators, virtually unreviewable power3 3 to do what they
genuinely believe is for our own good, were stirred when Bertram
Wolfe demonstrated that Lenin was entirely highminded in concluding long before the Revolution that the ignorant, downtrodden
Russian people could be rescued only by dedicated shock troops
who would unquestioningly adhere to a "party line."34 There is
mcntation of these policies, that they exhibit an active interest in the outcome of cases
pending before them ••••"
"Their constant striving to reach desired results tends to make most administrators
'convicting judges.' " The Executive Department of Government and the Rule of Law,
Address Before University of Michigan Summer School for Practicing Lawyers, Ann Arbor,
Mich., June 23, 1960, pp. 6, 9-10. [This address will appear in a forthcoming issue of the
Michigan Law Review.-Ed.]
29 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 14. See also Fuchs, The Hoover Commission and
Task Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedure, 31 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1955).
30 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 15.
31 Id. at 14.
32 Note 10 supra.
33 For inadequacy of judicial review, seep. 218 infra.
84 WOLFE, THREE WHO MADE THE REvOLUTION (1948); SHUB, LENIN (1948). Professor
Brogan said: "A patriotic Chinese, faced with the poverty of that country, with what may
be its increasing poverty and seeing no way out except a rapid increase in industrialization
and a rapid increase in the output of the land, may conclude, in no selfish or vulgar intention, that only a vigorous, rigorous, modem power in China can do both and provide the
necessary political authority without which the best schemes of industrial technicians and
agronomists will come to nothing. And to that end, he may put up with a great deal of
mendacity, a great deal of intellectual isolation and coercion, even with the shedding of a
great deal of blood. He may be willing to pay the price of revolution.'' BROGAN, THE PRICE
OF REVOLUTION 259 (1951).
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no need to dwell on the lamentable fruits of that policy or to equate
administrative adjudication with Stalinistic suppression of all
political rights. But to lodge virtually unreviewable discretion in
administrators to act for what they conceive to be our good may
well seem an unnecessary step in that direction. From Lenin we
can deduce that an Orwellian Big Brother who "knows best" is
not for us, that administrative powers can and should be tested by
impersonal tribunals. Agency adjudication was provided for
those instances in which a person claims that the facts do not come
within the agency rule or policy or that the policy or rule do not
come within the statute. On such issues, a litigant is entitled to a
judgment "unbiased" by a "mission or purpose."
Let it be admitted that from time to time courts, too, have
been swayed by their biases against socio-economic legislation.
One need only recall judicial opposition to minimum wage and
hour legislation.35 But the cure is not to substitute a legislative
or administrative bias for a judicial one. Rather it is to inculcate
in lawyers and judges a consciousness that adjudication requires
a never-ending alertness against identifying personal predilections
with the requirements of law.

Does the Separation of Functions Really Insulate?
Mr. Kintner would dismiss such considerations on the ground
that the Commission does not "exercise at one and the same time
the roles of prosecutor and judge" because "All investigational
work is handled by a separate bureau of investigation within the
Commission," and "upon completion of the investigation, if it
appears that complaint is warranted, the results of the investigation are referred to another separate bureau within the Commission, the Bureau of Litigation, which prepares a complaint ..." if
it concludes that to be in the public interest. When "the complaint has been drafted it is referred to the Commission." In
"looking at a complaint and directing its issuance the Commission
is merely signifying its belief that a probability of violation exists
85 Courts are now "more conscious of current economic and social trends than they
were two decades ago." Davison, An Administrative Court of the United States, 24 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 613, 617 (1956). Recently, Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Southern
District of New York referred to certain cases which were removed from the courts "at a
time when people were worried about the conservatism of the Court-a complaint which
isn't heard too often these days.•.•" Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace
With Modern Court-Developed Techniques Against Delay'I-A. Judge's View, 12 AJ:,. L. Buu..
103, 104 (1960).
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... ," a procedure whch Mr. Kintner assimilates to a ruling on a
demurrer or grant of certiorari.36 From this recital one infers that
the Commission first learns of a complaint after submission by the
Bureau of Litigation and that approval is more or less formal. On
paper this seems like an aseptic procedure, conducive to truly
judicial detachment. The need for insulation is real, for, as
former Chairman Hmvrey found, "if I delved into the investigative
file and made a personal study of the facts and the law that formed
the basis of the complaint, I ran the danger of prejudging the
matter."37
There is reason to believe that Mr. Kintner, and at least one
other commissioner, Mr. Secrest, have not been equally alive to the
"danger," and that they cannot in fact divorce themselves from
what the prosecutor-investigators are doing. Speaking with reference to "payola" practices in the radio-television industry on
March 9, 1960, Mr. Kintner stated, "Our investigational files in
the 60 cases where complaints have been issued or approved reveal
that payments have been made by manufacturers or distributors
to 255 disc jockeys or other employees of broadcast licensees ...."
(Emphasis added.) He tells us on the same occasion, apparently
on the basis of a "preliminary investigation to determine the
method and extent" of an activity designated as "plugola," that "in
soliciting clients for hidden plugs, one such firm has assured its
prospective clients that the hidden commercials would consist of"
five described items, and describes the "cost of these hidden commercials" and by whom they are "planted."38 Details of eight
complaints against food chains are found in his speech of October
19, 1959; 39 and he improved the occasion by describing a hypothetical case of "advertising allowances" which could "turn out to
Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 78-79.
The Federal Trade Commission -Present Problems and Suggested Changes,
Proceedings, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, April 4, 1957, p. 40 at 47 (hereinafter cited
Howrey, Fed. Trade Comm.) Mr. Howrey continues to be troubled by the problem. Id.
at 107.
88 Address, The Federal Trade Commission Today, before the Federal Bar Association,
Philadelphia Chapter, pp. 2 and 7.
39 Legal Obligations and Moral Responsibility of Powerful Food Buyers, before Nat'l
Ass'n of Food Chains, Washington, D.C., p. 6: "These 8 complaints contain allegations of
inducing discriminatory advertising allowances, illegal receipt of brokerage, illegal coercion
and price fixing, and mergers which may lessen competition.•••"
See also a large group of complaint letters quoted in Mr. Kintner's The Public Reports, Remarks at Chicago to Alpha Delta Sigma, Professional Advertising Fraternity,
November 24, 1959, which Mr. Kintner referred to the Bureau of Investigation, p. 4. See
also Statement, "Resurgens: The Federal Trade Commission in 1959," N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
-Antitrust Law Symposium -1960, p. 30 (hereinafter cited Kintner, Resurgens).
86 Kintner,
37 Howrey,
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have been highly unprofitable when the balance sheet includes the
cost of litigation,''40 a cheerful enough prediction from a prosecutor, but quaere whether it would be made by a judge.
Commissioner Robert T. Secrest, referring on June 1, 1960,
to a "factual record" developed in the Commission's insurance
investigation, detailed many disparities between the advertising
claims of the companies and the actual facts. For example, he
mentions a "typical claim" that the company would pay "up to
$15 a day for 100 hospital days ... for each sickness or accident"
and comments: "There were in fact many cases of accident or
sickness for which policies so represented did not provide payment. "41 From an investigator or prosecutor, this is quite appropriate, but does it not sound a note of "prejudgment" in the
mouth of a "judge?" Against this background, Commissioner
Secrest's statement on the same occasion that "the vote of the
Commission in issuing the 41 complaints ... was unanimous"42
suggests something more than pro forma approval of complaints.
Mr. Kintner tells us that the "Commission's principal role
[i.e., its enforcement program] ... is as wielder of the big stick." 43
And he takes pride in the performance of that role, stating that in
the first nine months of fiscal 1960 "the Commission issued 85
antimonopoly complaints. This was 5 more than the number issued during the entire 1959 fiscal year.''44 On June 3, 1960, Mr.
Kintner stated that the Commission filed 17 Clayton Act complaints during a certain period and that "Of these 17 cases, 9 have
already resulted in cease and desist orders," 45 an excellent batting
average, of which a prosecutor might well be proud. But would
a "judge" boast of a prosecutor's high conviction rate?
Consider, too, the singular identity between remarks by the
Associate Director of the Bureau of Litigation and a subsequent
speech by Mr. Kintner. On April 4, 1960, the former, addressing
the dairy industry, said:
1959, supra note 39, at 7.
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, San Francisco, p. 3. (Emphasis added.)
42ld. at 5.
43 Statement, The Current State of Advertising, Los Angeles Breakfast Club, Los
Angeles, June 15, 1960, p. 10.
44 Statement, One Goal Is Service, before National Independent Dairies Ass'n, '\V'ashington, D.C., April 4, 1960, p. 4 (Mr. Kintner's emphasis).
45 Statement, Some Suggestions for Compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, before
Carolinas-Virginia Purchasing Ag~nts Ass'n, N.C., p. 10.
40 Speech of Oct. 19,
41 Statement before
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"If there are those in your industry who take comfort in the
listing of these cases [a roster of complaints filed against industry members] and believe that the trade regulation laws
are concerned only with the competitive behavior of giant
concerns, a somber note of warning was sounded by the issuance of an FTC complaint six weeks ago against what must
be a relatively small dairy...." 46

On April 22, 1960, Mr. Kintner sounded the same "somber note
of warning" in virtually identical terms.47 Would a judge regard
the "issuance of a complaint" as a "somber note of warning?"
This "warning" was not adventitious, for Mr. Kintner states
that the Commission is "fired by a determination" to achieve "the
ideal of free and fair competition," and that "The Commission's
powers of investigation and subpoena are indispensable weapons
in the battle for an economy based upon free and fair competition.
The Commission serves warning that it will strenuously resist any
effort to diminish the effectiveness of these weapons, and it pledges
that they will never rust from lack of use." 48 He stated that "The
Federal Trade Commission quite honestly wishes to be a menace
to predators of the market place...." 49 Would a judge brandish
the "weapons" of the Commission at a business community which
must contest before him whether those weapons were properly
employed? And will not one who constantly evangelizes about
the enforcement duties of the Commission be hard put to maintain an open mind for the re-examination and re-interpretation
of the basic law which it administers? Every lawyer knows how
hard it is to discard a conviction and start afresh; only the inescapable exigencies of government should place the process of
adjudication under that handicap.50 Louis Hector has graphically
-46 Statement by William R. Tincher, The Federal Trade Commission and the Dairy
Industry, before National Independent Dairies Ass'n, Washington, D.C., p. 10.
47 Statement, The Federal Trade Commission and the Food Industry, before the
American Dry Milk Institute, Chicago, pp. 4-5.
Consider too Mr. Kintner's Statement, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, before
Sixth Annual Institute of Management for Appliance-TV Dealers, ·washington, D.C., August 8, 1960, p. 5: "\\Te are, however, determined to prevent misuse of bargain advertising
through every means at our disposal - education [etc.] .•• But when these means do not
work, our Bureaus of Investigation and Litigation are called upon for more convincing
action." (Emphasis added.)
-48 Kintner, Resurgens, supra note 39, at 32, 46. (Emphasis added.)
-40 Statement, Government and Trade Association Executives Have a Joint Responsibility for Compliance with the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Laws, before New York Society
of Association Executives, New York, N.Y., June 16, 1960, p. 4. (Emphasis added.)
60 When a prior investigation of the "basing point system" resulted in charges that
the Commission had prejudged the issues, the Supreme Court, faced by the painful fact
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illustrated the difficulty a .Board member has, when he dons his
judicial cap, in dismissing from his mind relevant matters which
he learned in his administrative-legislative capacity.111 Moreover,
anyone who has served in government knows that "separation"
operates as a permeable membrane rather than an air-tight partition, and that important staff views have a way of filtering through
as if by osmosis.62 How often we have heard new appointees complain that they are prisoners of the staff.
An illustration of the strains to which the fusion of functions
subjects the FTC's adjudicatory impartiality is furnished by the
Carnation case. Defendants, in return for a stipulation that they
might produce certain types of transactions by totals, agreed not
to challenge Commission counsel's amendment of the complaint
after the hearing began. Having amended and thus profited by
the stipulation, Commission counsel sought to repudiate it and to
obtain detailed evidence. The Examiner rejected the repudiation
but was reversed by the Commission. Though recognizing that
stipulations "should not be entered into lightly and when entered
should be observed to the letter," the Commission nevertheless
concluded that the stipulation should be set aside because it placed
"an undue restriction on the obtaining of information which otherwise may be necessary to establish the case of counsel supporting
the complaints and to that extent it is contrary to the public interest."112• Observe the facile identification of the prosecution's
that if the Commission were disqualified the "complaint could not have been acted upon
by the Commission or by any other government agency" could yet offer only the scant
comfort that "the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result of
its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were
irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents' basing point practices." Federal Trade
Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
Contrast this with the judicial standard: "Every litigant is entitled to nothing less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, who must possess the disinterestedness of a
total stranger to the interests of the parties ...•" Barnard v. Judge of Superior Court, 191
Mich. 567, 574 (1916), quoting Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Kirk, 102 Miss. 41, 54 (1912).
111 For two years the CAB had been urging carriers to introduce new low promotional
fares in order to build up traffic and had discussed various plans. Suppose, says Mr. Hector,
that one of the carriers files a new low promotional tariff and that two other carriers file
a protest. How, asks he, can the Board forget its talks as policy makers and become judges
looking only to the record, particularly when still talking to the same carriers on other
tariffs still in the planning stage. To discontinue such talks is to make policy in a
vacuum. He concludes that such conversations "undoubtedly influence adjudication" be•
cause the facts and impressions gained thereby simply cannot be forgotten. Hector, Memorandum, supra note 4, at 954-55.
62 See note 18 supra.
62• In the Matter of Carnation Co., Docket No. 6172-79, March 14, 1956. Trade Reg.
Rep. (1956) ,i26,021. (Emphasis added.)
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case with the public interest. District attorneys also represent the
public interest in prosecuting law violators, but what court would
out of hand release them from their stipulations solely because
they could thereby better present their case?5 3 Dissenting, Commissioner Lowell Mason justly stated that this repudiation "places
us in a partisan role at variance with our judicial protestations."114
The foregoing facts, to my mind, seriously impeach the claim
that the "separation of functions" is "sufficient safeguard" against
the "danger" presented by the union of adjudication and prosecution;1515 they remove criticism of this union from the realm of "abstraction" and suggest rather that it is sheer web-spinning to premise that incompatible functions lodged in one and the same man
can be "separated" by a paper separation.
No Need To Lose Expertise
Pointing to Supreme Court reliance on agency expertise and
the Hoover Task Forces' recognition of the FTC's "special competence," Mr. Kintner concludes that "such special competence
largely would be lost" through transfer of its judicial functions. 116
The benefits attributed to administrative "expertise" have too
158 Ordinarily stipulations are binding and will be set aside only upon proof of mistake,
fraud, overreaching or oppressive hardship. 7 CYc. FED. PRO. 454-55 (2d ed. 1943). So,
the Commission was permitted to set a stipulation aside entered under "mistake of fact."
P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1950). But Lorillard, upon which
Carnation relies, does not support the proposition that anything which facilitates presentation of the prosecution's case authorizes repudiation of a stipulation.
15i Reprinted in MASON, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 77, 80 (1959). Commissioner Mason
reminds us that "welshing is dirty business" in any context. Id. at 79. Mr. Kintner points
out that in 1956 the Commission dismissed 32% of the cases which came before it. Kintner,
Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, at 443. 'Without examination of the cases the percentage is meaningless. Possibly there was so little evidence as to show plainly that the
cases never should have been brought, and possibly adequate screening by the Commission
itself would siphon off such prosecutions. Again, the errors may have been so glaring as
to invite reversals by the courts of appeals if left uncorrected by the Commission.
155 Mr. Kintner has uneasily alluded to the apparent "inconsistency in having investigative functions lodged with the group that also adjudicates," but concluded "if sufficient
safeguards are thrown about the adjudicative process that it will work••.•" Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 46·47. See note 18 supra.
156 Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, at 494. Former Chairman Howrey
said, "as my friends on the Commission would be the first to admit, the courts' deference
to the Commission has been somewhat misleading. Many of the references to the expertness of the Commission, upon closer examination, are found to be mere restatements of
legislative intent rather than expressions of confidence. And more than one judge has
gone out of his way to criticize the Commission." Howrey, Fed. Trade Comm., supra note
37, at 42.
Indeed, Mr. Kintner himself tells us that the Supreme Court "has too often found the
need to overrule the Commission's specialized judgment." Kintner, Revitalized FTC, supra
note 19, at 1146.
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long rested on unquestioned assumptions.57 Mr. Kintner himself
quite recently, answering the question "can we truthfully say that
those who bear the responsibility of decision truly possess it [expertise] in the expected measure," states that "the obvious and
sorrowful answer must be 'no.' " 57 a The mine-run agency appointee is not an expert and generally does not stay long enough
at his post to become an expert. When Mr. Kintner points to the
fact that Commissioner Kern and himself were promoted from the
staff,58 he overlooks that such promotions are the exception, that
the lion's share of administrative appointments go to outsiders
without the slightest claim to expertise. Mr. James M. Landis tells
us that when he became Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board
he had "little knowledge of the subject." 59 And as Landis points
out, rotation in office of agency members is "only too common,'' 00
and in consequence "that the type of expertise resulting from experience is not developed... .'' 60 a Mr. Kintner himself has recorded
the displacement of three incumbent commissioners, Carson, Spingarn and Carretta, by the Eisenhower Administration at the FTC; 61
two others, Mead and Mason, have since been displaced-a complete housecleaning. Former SEC Commissioner McConnaughey
reminds us that in its twenty-five years of existence the SEC "has
had maybe 15 Chairmen," 62 and the bulk of its commissioners, my
own study revealed, served one, two and three years. Such rapid
turnover, justly stated Louis Hector, has made "almost meaningless the 'expertise' which agency members are supposed to develop
in long terms of service.'' 63 By excluding himself, Mr. Kintner is
able to arrive at an average service of four years of the incumbent
FTC commissioners. 64 I daresay that the average incumbent district judge in the District of Columbia or on the Tax Court has
been sitting about fifteen years. Is it not reasonable to assume,
with lifetime tenure for judges of a Trade Court, that the judges
57 We "should be examining the truth of certain legends • • • built up about the
administrative process.... The first of these is the legend of its possession of expertise."
Landis, supra note 11, at 6. Note the reference by Professor Gellhorn, supra note 10 to
"supposed administrative expertness."
57• Kintner, Fed. Ad. Law, supra note 1, at 6.
58 Kintner, The Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at !Yl7.
59 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 112.
60 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 96.
60• Landis, supra note 11, at 9.
61 Kintner, Revitalized FTC, supra note 19, at 1147.
62 Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 126.
63 Supra note 51, at 957.
64 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at !Yl7.
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will have an opportunity to develop the expertise which thus far
has merely been an administrative mirage?
If the agency member is not an expert, at least, it is argued, he
can be advised by specialists. So, Mr. Kintner stresses that "At the
FTC our devoted staff has acquired several thousand man-years of
experience, which is constantly available to the commissioners." 65
Experience has shown, says Professor Davis, that "controversies
involving, say, questions of law, accounting, and engineering, may
best be decided by an agency which is advised by lawyers and accountants and engineers." 66 The Commission itself excludes those
engaged in performing investigative or prosecuting functions in
any adjudicative proceeding from advising the Commission ex
parte therein. 67 The reason for such exclusion, said the Attorney
General's 1941 Report, is that "A man who has buried himself in
one side of an issue is disabled from bringing to its decision that
dispassionate judgment which Anglo-American tradition demands
of officials who decide questions." Continues the report, "the view
of the investigators and advocates [should] be presented only in
open hearing where they can be known and met by those who may
be adversely affected by them." 68 Precisely the same considerations
should govern all members of the investigating and prosecuting
staffs and of staff experts as well. One who has worked for an
agency knows that there is a "party line" in such matters. A particular suit is one of a series that may be in preparation by other staff
members who vibrate sympathetically. Technical and unifying
legal theories are constantly under discussion with fellow staff
members. And the staff "experts" are by no means free of evangelistic zeal; often they trigger prosecutions. Generally speaking,
"experts" tend to be "biased" for the party who calls them, 69 and
there is no reason to conclude that government experts are immune. To the contrary, their bias may be intensified because
they are constantly immersed in a stream of "mission or purpose."
Then, too, experts are not infallible; the books are full of instances
in which experts have been tripped on faulty premises or untenable
inferences. Speaking of expert inferences "drawn from an extensive scrutiny of uncontradicted 'background' data ... procured by
65 Ibid.

(Emphasis added.)
oo Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 15.
67 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 81.
68 REPORT OF ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COM!IUTIEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 56 (1941).
60 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 646-7 (3d ed. 1940); cf. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 69

(1942).
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staff experts and made part of the record," Judge Jerome Frank
stated: "In all candor, it must be noted that, even as to such facts,
there may be legitimate differences of opinion. For so-called 'economic data' are, often not 'data' (i.e., given) but involve interpretations; and there may legitimately be differing expert interpretations. "70 While, therefore, expert assistance is of great value in
enabling an agency to prepare and prosecute a case, expert aid to
adjudicators must in the interest of justice be subject to correction
by cross-examination lest error be sealed in. Such factors presumably led Professor Davis, whose "careful scholarship and
academic detachment" were recently lauded by Mr. Kintner,71 to
state:
"[T]here is danger in consultation by the agency heads with
the staff specialists behind the scenes, when ideas or information are brought into a case without giving representatives of
the parties sufficient opportunity to know what it is, and opportunity to meet it. I think there is great danger."
The "cure," he said, is to
"require that the significant factual material that is used for
decision shall be placed on the record or otherwise made
known to the parties so that there will be an adequate opportunity to rebut or to explain or to cross-examine, as the
case may be." 72
Fair play demands no less. But if expert testimony is to be placed
on record, the expertise argument goes down the drain, for the
agency tribunal will then enjoy no advantage over a court. Courts,
too, can hear experts, and judges who remain on the bench, as for
example on the Tax Court, will understand this record testimony
far better than the fleeting agency appointee. And a concomitant
and by no means inconsiderable advantage will flow from removal
of the agency's adjudicatory function: instead of being insulated
from its experts, the Commission will then be enabled to work
closely with them in the formulation of enforcement programs and
the initiation and prosecution of cases with the object of spreading
the results before the Trade Court. Moreover, as Professor Jaffe
recently remarked,72 • a separate adjudicatory organ
'10 FRANK, op. cit. supra note 69, at 122.
71 Kintner on Davis, supra note 2, at 630.

Hearings, supra note 2, at 26.
on Davis, supra note 10, at 1641.

72 Harris

72• Jaffe
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"may have its own specialists and it may learn a great deal
from a specialized administrative and enforcement agency
appearing before it. In some situations, indeed, the values of
specialization may in this way be more effectively realized.
There will be less hostility to free exchange between the adjudicators and their staff when their role is limited to adjudication."

Individual Opinion Writing and Institutional Decisions
The controversy over institutional decisions-opinions written
by an anonymous opinion-writing staff-was stirred afresh by Louis
Hector's candid report to the President respecting Civil Aeronautics Board practices.73 Professor Davis, a proponent of agency
adjudication, earlier noted that "the agency heads may in fact lean
so heavily on the work of the staff as to know little or nothing of the
problems involved in many of the cases decided in the agency's
name." 74 And he more recently stated, "The weaknesses of the institutional decision lie in its anonymity, in its reliance on extrarecord advice, in frustration of parties' desire to reach the men who
influence the decision behind the scenes, and in the separation of
the deciding function from the writing of the opinion or report." 7is
To this may be added a breakdown of the case-to-case policy-making
which was deemed an important attribute of agency adjudication.76
Hector discloses an agency failure to engage in such policy-making,
one of the reasons being that the agency members merely vote on
the outcome of a case and the opinion justifying the outcome is
written by the staff. The staff "consciously avoid statements of
general principle" so as to "be able to write an opinion justifying
an opposite conclusion the next day.'' 77 Lest this be deemed an
isolated practice, Hector cites the statement of the FCC Chairman
that "there is nothing, especially in the FCC ... that you can ...
73 Hector, Memorandum, supra note 4. Decisions are written by an opinion-writing
staff after the Board makes its decision. Id. at 947. The Board does not tell the writers
in detail what to put in the opinion. Ibid. Seldom do the published opinions deviate from
the drafts submitted and in one case the Board was urged to release a 71-page opinion
which had just reached it the day before. Id. at 947-48. In no case did the opinion-writers
come back and tell the Board that the facts do not square with the decision. Id. at 948.
Since the Board does not read the record, id. at 946, it must be endowed with a power of
factual divination that surpasses the wildest feats claimed for extra-sensory perception.
74 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 330 (1951).
71S 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 37 (1958), although he regards the institutional decision as "inevitable," infra, p. 216.
7G SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
77 Hector, Memorandum, supra note 4, at 942-43.
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rely on." 78 In a word, the commissioners, acting judicially, says
Hector, "seldom enunciate policy." 79
Striking confirmation for this view was recently furnished by
ICC Commissioner Webb:
"If, as I believe, the Commission's voice is too often uncertain, it is because an anonymous professional staff of opinion
writers cannot reasonably be expected to articulate vital principles when they receive little or no guidance from individual
Commissioners .... Today, and for some years past, members
of the Commission have been unable to assume any large
measure of responsibility for the writing of important Commission opinions."80

Dissatisfaction with "the institutional approach to the decision of
cases which tends to substitute bureaucratic red tape for the personal participation of NLRB members" was recently noted by the
Cox Advisory Panel.81
Indeed, Professor Davis states that "the objection to the separation of deciding from opinion writing may be unanswerable
except in terms of inevitability," 82 the "inevitability" arising from
the sheer volume of work in some agencies. But, as Professor
Jaffe observes, "the inevitability is a consequence of the choice to
load up the 'members' of the agency with ultimate responsibility
for a great variety of tasks.... The vice of the argument, if any,
proceeds from the . . . assumption that all the related tasks in an
area, e.g. 'policy making' and adjudication, must be under a common direction." 83
at 942 n. 31, quoting 11 An. L. BULL. 137 (1958).
at 946. Landis states that opinion-writing by an anonymous staff has "resulted
in the lack of development of adequate standards in various administrative fields." Landis,
supra note 11, at 7.
80 Address, The Voice of the Interstate Commerce Commission, before the Richmond
Chapter of the ICC Practitioners Ass'n, Richmond, Va., May 5, 1960, p. 2. Commissioner
Webb goes on to state: "the report writer knows that the best way to guard against re•
writing a draft report is to avoid an extended discussion of controversial issues of trans•
portation policy and clear-cut findings on hotly contested issues of fact . • • the report
writer, having little or no guidance from any Commissioner, is quite naturally disposed to
write an ad hoc opinion having a minimum of value as a precedent." Id. at 4.
81 REPORT TO THE SENATE LABOR COMMITI'EE BY ADVISORY PANEL ON LABOR•MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS LAw, Professor Archibald Cox, chairman, Organization 8: Procedure of NLRB,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 2, 1960), Doc. No. 81, p. 2. It recommended "less reliance upon
legal assistants, elimination of the internal procedures by which legal assistants of the
several members confer upon, and virtually determine, the Board's decision .•••" (p. 7).
And it concluded, "Members should give personal attention to, and have personal respon•
sibility for, all the decisions in which they participate." (p. 6).
82 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 90 (1958). Commissioner Webb, supra note
80, at 2, states that "the institutional decision is presently a matter of stark necessity."
83 Jaffe on Davis, supra note IO, at 1641.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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Anticipating objections to "institutional decision" ·writing, Mr.
Kintner emphasizes that the FTC commissioners explain their
votes in individually prepared opinions, that they "do not merely
rubber stamp the work of an anonymous professional staff of
opinion ·writers. " 84 Professor Davis is of the view that such opinion
"t\TI"iting by agency members is too burdensome to be feasible. 811
That view has considerable force. In the 1958-1959 fiscal year,
the FTC issued 355 opinions,86 or 71 opinions per commissioner.
Consider the manifold additional duties of the Commission: the
work of the Trade Conferences,87 the Commission's coordination
of investigation and litigation programs,88 its masterminding of
improvements in administration,89 to which may be added the
necessity of testifying before congressional investigating and
budgetary committees, the submission of investigatory reports to
Congress,00 the promulgation of rules and regulations, and, last
but not least, the amount of time spent by commissioners on the
necessary task of educating American business. This last was intended to be one of its most important functions, 91 and Mr. Kintner
has energetically addressed himself thereto. It is reported that
"during his term [one year] as Chairman, Kintner has made 160
speeches, appeared 300 times on TV programs, and held nearly
300 press conferences."91 • When, one wonders, can Mr. Kintner let alone the mine-run commissioner who does not rejoice in his
extraordinary energy - find time to study the massive records of
Commission proceedings, to read voluminous briefs, do necessary
legal research and prepare his own 71 opinions, let alone prepare
84. Kinter, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 972. He recently stated that "many voices
have been raised in opposition to the institutional decision. To these I add my own."
Kintner, Fed. Ad. Law, supra note I, at 6. It is widely believed that the Commission's
"Division of Special Legal Assistants" writes the majority opinions for the commissioners.
85 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 90 (1958).
86 Commissioner "\Vebb, supra note 80, at 3.
87 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 971.
88 Kintner, Resurgens, supra note 39, passim.
80 E.g., the new Robinson-Patman Task Forces treated by the Commission for better
enforcement of that act, id. at 3-4. See also Kintner, Statement, A Challenge to the Food
Industry, before Grocery Manufacturers of America, New York, N.Y., Nov. 9, 1959, pp. 19-20.
90 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 974. See also Kintner, Statement, Legal
Obligations and Moral Responsibility of Powerful Food Buyers, before Nat'! Ass'n of Food
Chains, Washington, D.C., Oct. 19, 1959, pp. 2-3.
91 Mr. Kintner agteed that the FTC "was designed to be an educational body for
businessmen •.••" Proceedings, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Washington, D.C., April
4-5, 1957, p. 113. See also Kintner, Statement, Responsibilities of Government and Business
in Our Free Market Economy, before Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Chicago, Ill., May
17, 1960, pp. 3-4.
01• 106 CoNG. REc. 15605 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1960) reprinting an article published in
the Daily News, Aug. 15, 1960.
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himself intelligently to assay the remaining 284 drafted by his
fellow commissioners?

Judicial Review of FTC Orders Is Inadequate Substitute
for Trade Court Initial Adjudication
Deficiencies in administrative adjudication, Mr. Kintner intimates, are curable on judicial review. For cease-and-desist orders
"are not self-executing," and a respondent "gets court review of
the Commission's determinations of law, and the facts of violation...." 92 But the facts underlying the order are virtually impregnable to attack, because "the courts are largely bound in [review] proceedings by administrative determinations of fact, which
are thus similarly conclusive upon the respondents." 93 We need
to remember, as Judge Jerome Frank emphasized, that" 'the facts,'
when there is a clash of testimony, are in truth nothing but a subjective reaction of the judge or jury [or Commission] to the testimony ... [their] guess as to [the conduct of the parties]," 04 and
that the "heart of the fact finding process often is the drawing of
inferences from the evidence." 95 Since, where the facts are the
"prime factor in arriving at a decision the trial judge . . . often
has a discretion ... which is beyond control," 96 and since "the
scope of review of administrative findings is narrower than the
scope of review of a judge's findings," 97 well may the administrator
say, "Let me but find the facts and I care not who writes the laws."
So long as administrative disinterestedness is suspect, judicial review of virtually unreviewable fact findings can be no adequate
substitute for initially dispassionate adjudication.

Will a Trade Court Impair Present Powers of Settlement?
To take away the adjudicatory power, Mr. Kintner states,
"would destroy, in great part, the effectiveness of other techniques
by which the Commission achieves compliance with the trade regu92 Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, at 443-44.
93 Fuchs, The Hoover Commission Report, supra note 29, at 20. (Emphasis added.)
94 FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 74-75 (1942). Judge Frank cites an SEC opinion which
refers to the "inescapable subjective factors in the minds of those who pass judgment and
is therefore not safeguarded against error." Id. at 121.
95 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 137 (1958). Former Commissioner Lowell
Mason found that in the administrative scales "one feather of government inference is
worth a ton of a private citizen's facts." THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 303 (1959).
96 FRANK, op. cit. supra note 94, at 92.
97 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 95, at 121.
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lation laws without resort to formal proceedings."98 More specifically, he says, "the existence of the power to issue cease-and-desist
orders assists the Commission in securing the closing of cases by
voluntary00 compliance after investigation, by stipulations, and by
consent orders after a complaint is issued."100 "Consent orders"
could, of course, be processed as well after filing of a complaint in
the Trade Court, and, as Herbert Clark states, the mere "decision
by the Federal Trade Commission to take the matter to court would
in many cases lead to a consent order."101 The Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice gets a substantial number of consent
decrees without having the adjudicatory power. There must in
consequence be some magic in the mere "existence" of the FTC
adjudicatory power, presumably the confidence of the Commission's prosecutors - and the correlative fear of respondents - that
the Commission is more apt to s,ving the "Big Stick"102 - issue a
cease-and-desist order - than is an "unbiased" court. Mr. Kintner
quotes the Attorney General's Committee Report, 1941, that "amicable disposition of cases is far less likely where ... the prosecuting
officials cannot turn to the deciding branch to discover the law and
the applicable policies."103 If the "separation" of which Mr. Kintner boasts is meaningful, neither the investigating nor prosecuting
officials should discuss a particular case with the Commission which
it may later be called upon to judge. In truth, the trade court proposals, by releasing the Commission from its adjudicatory task,
would really make it available for staff discussion of "law and
applicable policies," uninhibited by embarrassing considerations of
"separation of functions."

No Transfer of Legislative Power
Mr. Kintner argues that in proposing to transfer the function
of deciding whether to issue "cease-and-desist" orders "the leaders
llS Kintner on Davis, supra note 2, at 631; Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2,
mG~9~
.
llO The moderator of a discussion before the ABA Antitrust Section, Robert w·. Austin,
in which Mr. Kintner was stressing "the purely voluntary aspect of a stipulation" said, "I
remember stipulations offered to me, already written, and with no negotiations and being
told I took either the stipulation or the complaint." Proceedings, ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Washington, D.C., April 4-5, 1957, p. 113.
100 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 976. See also Freer, The Case Against the
Trade Regulation Section of the Proposed Administrative Court, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
6!17, 647-48 (1956); Nutting, The Administrative Court, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1384, 1387 (1955).
101 Clark, Transfer of Functions, supra note 23, at 57.
102 See note 4!1 supra.
103 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 90.
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of the American Bar Association are promoting the transfer to a
constitutional court of functions which are primarily legislative... .''104 For this he cites no less an authority than the ABA
itself in a 1936 report,105 saying that "obviously, if the 1936 Special
Committee was right the 1956 Special Committee is wrong."106
The ABA, of course, is not infallible, and it would not be remarkable to find a group of lawyers differing with their predecessors
after the lapse of twenty years. Have we not the august example
of the Supreme Court? But the fact is that in 1936 the ABA Committee, like its 1956 successor, said, "Cease and desist orders are
nothing more nor less than injunctions in effect... .''107 This is
the view of the courts,108 and it follows logically from the fact that
an injunction is a court order requiring a person to do or refrain
from doing a particular thing.109 Mr. Kintner himself states that
cease-and-desist orders "look like injunctions ...." 110 Such orders,
of course, are judicial, not legislative. How can orders entered in
adversary proceedings wherein the parties assert conflicting claims
and the tribunal inquires whether past actions violate existing law
be anything but judicial?
Mr. Kintner informs us, however, that "The Supreme Court
supports the 1936 Committee: 'In administering the provisions of
the statute in respect of 'unfair methods of competition' - that is
to say in filling in and administering the details embodied in that
general standard - the Commission acts in part quasi-legislatively
and in part quasi-judicially,'" quoting Humphrey's Executor v.
104 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 80.
105 Id. at 77, citing Report of the ABA Special Committee

on Administrative Law 238

(1936).
106 Ibid.
101 Report,

supra note 105, at 238. With respect to the jurisdiction "to prescribe rates,
classification practices and regulations, for the future," the 1936 Report went on to say
that the "exercise of such a function has usually been regarded by the courts as a legislative act.•.•The committee believes that even eventually it will not be desirable to lodge
the original exercise of most of these functions in the Court, both for practical reasons and
because the functions approach so closely to the legislative field." Ibid.
If the general reference is somewhat ambiguous, is it yet fair to deduce that the 1936
'Report concluded that an injunction is legislative, like prescribing "rates • • . for the
future?"
10s "[A] cease and desist order is of the nature of an injunction." NLRB v. Tehel
"Bottling Co., 129 F.2d 250, 255 (8th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir.
1939). See also Fuchs, supra note 29, at 20.
109 Consolidated Coal &: Coke Co. v. Beale, 282 Fed. 934, 935 (S.D. Ohio 1922); Gainsburg
-v. Dodge, 193 Ark. 473, 476 (1937); Railroad Commission of Texas v. McDonald Motor
·Freight Lines, 127 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
110 Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, supra note 2, at 443 n.23, quoting, "The cease and
-desist order is in effect, an administrative injunction." Harris, The Hoover Commission
.Report: Improvement of Legal Services and Procedure, 41 A.B.A.J. 713, 716 (1955).
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United States.111 That case in no way involved the nature of the
Commission's power to apply a statute to a particular case - a
familiar judicial function - but the power of the President to remove a member of an independent agency without qualification.
Its reference to the two means of "filling in" may be regarded as
convenient shorthand for the legislative rule-making and the
judicial "cease-and-desist" processes of administering the "unfair
competition" provision. We should not attribute to a casual, not
really relevant, dictum an intention to obliterate the carefully
drawn, long-established line between judicial and legislative action.
Mr. Kintner also suggests that to the extent that the proposed
transfer "includes the Commission's authority to define 'unfair
methods of competition' . . . this might be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the judicial branch...." 112 Since
the ABA proposal is confined to transfer of the adjudicatory power,
it does not comprehend the truly legislative rule-making power.
By power to "define," Mr. Kintner must necessarily mean, therefore, the adjudicatory power to "interpret" the statutory terms.
This is an everyday judicial function. Mr. Kintner himself quotes
a Supreme Court statement that "this general language [of the
relevant Clayton Act] was deliberately left to the 'Commission
and the courts' for definition . ..." 113 For years the courts have
been "filling in" and "defining" the details of the Sherman Act
"restraints of trade." The fact, therefore, that, in Mr. Kintner's
words, "Each time that the Commission issues an order to cease
and desist . . . it is filling in the meaning of the statute . . . , " 114
does not convert that judicial act into a legislative one. For, as he
said elsewhere, the "ultimate application" of the FTC act is "to
be arrived at 'by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion.' " 1111
Miscellaneous
I. No Need To Discard Precedents. Mr. Kintner tells us, that
"the forty-five years of precedent contained in the Federal Trade
Commission Reports furnishes a valuable exposition of policy," a
111295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). Kintner, Trade Court and A.BA, sup,,-a note 2, at 77.
112 Kintner, Tmde Court Proposal, sup,,-a note 2, at 444.
113 Kintner, Trade Court and A.BA, supra note 2, at 87, quoting FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
114 Kintner, Trade Court Proposal, sup,,-a note 2, at 444.
1111 Kintner, Revitalized FTC, sup,,-a note 19, at 1190.
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"body of precedent [which] should not be discarded lightly.''116
But in a more revealing moment, Mr. Kintner disclosed that
"Traditionally, Commission findings were couched in formalistic terms often a mere parroting of the language of the
complaint, without narrative statement of any kind or any insight into the ratiocination of the decision. Gerard Henderson, in 1924, termed the decisions 'masterpieces of ambiguity.'
In 1941, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure considered Commission decisions 'of indifferent
value as precedents.' ... Professor Davis, as recently as 1951,
agreed that the Commission 'has been glaringly deficient in its
failure to prepare reasoned opinions.'
"The courts, too, have regularly upbraided the Commission for the quality of its decisions.''117
But the " 'new' Commission," installed by the Eisenhower administration, "now issues an opinion in every case," a practice inaugurated during the past five years.118 This scarcely adds up to a
"valuable exposition of policy" contained in "forty-five years of
precedent." And in view of the "great weight" attached by the
courts to administrative interpretation,119 who is to say that a trade
court will "lightly discard" its administrative predecessor's "valuable precedents?"
2. The Commerce Court. "Many years ago," states Mr. Kintner, "in response to pressure by the American Bar Association,
Congress created a specialized commerce court which was abolished
after three years because of its poor performance record.... Despite the specialization, the commerce court was found to be ·wrong
with respect to 10 of its 12 decisions which were reviewed by the
Supreme Court.''120 Thus specialization, which is repeatedly extolled as a virtue in agencies, unaccountably results in "poor performance" when acquired by a court. In fact, however, the Commerce Court "was born in a political storm, almost at once became
the object of political attack ... [and] under a new administration
was choked to death. . . .''121 From the death of the Commerce
116 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 971.
117 Kintner, Revitalized FTC, supra note 19, at 1151-52.
118 Ibid., Harris Hearings, supra note 2, at 127.
119 See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S.
120 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 94.
121 Rightmire, Special Federal Courts, 13 ILL. L. REv. 97

534, 549 (1940).

(1918). Nor is the transfer
of the power to review administrative adjudications from the courts of appeals to the
commerce court an apt analogy for the transfer of power to make administrative adjudications to a Trade Court. Many who esteem specialization at the trial level believe that the
advantage lies with broad, overall experience on review.
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Court in the heat of political battle,1 22 it cannot be concluded that
a specialized court is synonymous with "poor performance."
3. Waiting for Administrative Self-Improvement. Repeatedly
Mr. Kintner stresses that the administrative process can be improved - apparently by the agencies - and that it "should not be
abandoned for an untested utopian alternative ..." until such improvement is demonstrably ineffective.123 Presumably it is not
unfair to evaluate the possibility of future self-improvement by
past performance. On this score I cannot improve on Mr. Kintner's
o·wn statements:
"Commission sluggishness has been repeatedly scored in the
past. A 1946 Congressional inquiry uncovered startling
evidence of delay in the processing of cases. In some cases as
many as 8 years elapsed before completion .... A 1951 House
Report found that 'an inordinate amount of time has been
devoted to just plain "sleeping on a case." '
"Perhaps most glaring of the Commission's past infirmities
has been its compliance program. . .. A 1946 Congressional
inquiry reported with some astonishment that the Commission had no 'systematic follow-up' of Commission orders ...
to determine whether or not the orders actually [Mr. Kintner's
italics] were being obeyed. . . . In 1951 a House group reported: 'In spite of the interest recently displayed by the Commission in enforcing its orders, its compliance program is still
very weak.' " 124
122 Professors Frankfurter and Landis tell us that President Taft urged creation of a
commerce court for reasons analogous to "those which induced Congress to create the
Court of Customs Appeals" [THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 156 (1928)], that the
proposal at once "drew the fire of the then 'insurgent' group in the Senate" [id. at 157],
11upported by the Democrats [id. at 158-59], and that "the gravaman of their objection
furnishes the keynote of the opposition during the debate of the following 5 months and
forecasts the fate of the court. It was feared that the bent of mind and the environment
of the judges selected for such a court would incline them towards the railroads and against
the public interest, in the dramatic conflict of 'public' against 'railroads,' in terms of
which the problem of railroad control was conceived.'' Id. at 157.
In a word, the Commerce Court "entered an environment partial to the [Interstate
Commerce] Commission and distrustful of courts.••• [T]he Court, heedless of the public
temper, promptly began to reverse the Commission and to curb its activity. • . . [T]he
Commerce Court was itself promptly reversed and curbed by the Supreme Court.'' Id. at
165. The Commerce Court, "itself thus furnished apparent vindication of the foreboding
prophecies of those who had bitterly contested its creation. The movement for its abolition,
which was promptly under way, thus assumed the character of a revolt against the Administration ..• .'' Id. at 166. When " .•. Democracy came to power on March 4, 1913, the
Court's doom was sealed.'' Id. at 171.
123 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 968.
124 Kintner, Revitalized FTC, supra note 19, at ll48, ll50.
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Mr. Kintner's candid acknowledgment of his predecessors' sins is
but a prelude to his recital of changes wrought by the "new"
dispensation in 1953.
But we also have some "sleeping" on the part of the "New
Commission" which we are entitled to consider in evaluating a
plea for the chance to benefit by self-improvement. The Commission, Mr. Kintner tells us, is "engaged in a continuous search for
methods that may be of use in eliminating delay."126 In April
1957, former Chairman Howrey, addressing the meeting before
which Mr. Kintner launched his attack on the ABA Trade Court
proposals, said that "In some respects FTC procedures are still in
the 'horse and buggy' stage as compared 1vith federal court procedures," that "Because of the lack of such modem techniques as
pretrial discovery . . . the trial of the so-called 'big case' before a
hearing examiner is bound to be more cumbersome and dravm out
than similar trials before a court," and that "It is high time . . .
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [which contain "extremely liberal provisions for discovery"] be followed in FTC adversary hearings."126 It is "high time," indeed, for the Federal
Rules have been in effect since 1938. A similar call was issued on
May 7, 1959, by Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.127 In a symposium before the ABA Section of Administrative Law which met
in Miami Beach, Florida, in August 1959, I outlined a statutory
scaffolding which would support administrative regulations making discovery available, pointing out that the FTC already enjoyed
the advantage of one-sided discovery through its investigation and
subpoena procedures. Not'\vithstanding that, Mr. Kintner, in the
same issue of the Administrative Law Bulletin which printed that
outline,128 stated that "if improvement in administrative process
is necessary and can be supplied from within, . . . we should look
upon it as compulsory [Mr. Kintner's italics] from within rather
than voluntary,"129 discovery is yet to be made available by the
FTC. If a lag between 1951 and 1953 entitled the "New Commis125 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 973.
126 Howry, Fed. Trade Comm., supra note 37, at 44-45. (Emphasis added.)
121 Address, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace with Modern Court-developed

Techniques Against Delay?-A Judge's View, before the Federal Trade Examiners Conference, Silver Spring, Maryland, reprinted 12 AD. L. BULL. 103 (1960). Judge Kaufman
quotes (id. at 115) 1 DAv1s, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 589 (1958): "Probably no sound
reason can be given for failure to extend to administrative adjudication the discovery procedures worked out for judicial proceedings.''
12s Berger, "Discovery in Administrative Proceedings," 12 AD. L. BULL. 28 (1959).
129 12 AD. L. BULL. 3 (1959).
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sion" to claim credit for the cure is it not equally to blame for
failing still to act on ex-Chairman Howrey's call in 1957? This
history, to my mind, suggests the wisdom of preferring a legislative
transfer of judicial functions to waiting on possible administrative
self-improvement,130 particularly in an area where by the nature
of the problem self-improvement is virtually impossible.
4. Why Single Out the FTC. Why, asks Mr. Kintner, single
out the FTC, the agency which has gone so far to achieve an internal separation of functions. 131 The answer lies in the nature of
its functions. The Attorney General's Committee stated in 1941:
"There are . . . some agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission and the National Labor Relations Board whose
principal duty is the enforcement, by decision of cases, of certain statutory prohibitions. In the case of such agencies, the
practical objection ... to isolating the adjudicatory function
and handing it over to some independent body would not
exist to the same extent.... And it is undoubtedly true that
agencies whose only substantial task is that of enforcing the
prohibitions of a statute through adjudication, especially in
such controversial fields as that of unfair methods of business
competition and labor relations, are peculiarly in danger of
being charged with bias by those against whom the prohibitions are sought to be enforced. " 132
The Commission's "principal role in policymaking is performed
by applying broad statutes to individual cases,"133 a typical judicial
function, expressed in characteristic judicial form by issuance of
the injunction-like "cease-and-desist" order. It is therefore a logical candidate for primacy in separating adjudication from prosecution.
The reasons advanced by the Attorney General's Committee
in 1941 against separating FTC prosecution from adjudication
deserve re-examination. First is the "danger of friction and of a
break-down of responsibility as between the two complementary
agencies."184 The answer of the minority, Messrs. McFarland,.
130 Mr. Kintner testified in 1958 that "not enough has been done by the Government
agencies towards implementing the excellent recommendations ••• of the President's Conference on Administrative Procedure of 1953 and 1954." Harris Hearings, supra note 2~
at 44.
131 Kintner, Trade Court and ABA, supra note 2, at 90, 81.
182 REPORT OF TIIE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

58-

(1941). (Emphasis added.)
lSS Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 975, 970.
lM REPORT OF ATIORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMrrn:E ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 58,

(1941).
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Stason and Vanderbilt, has gained force with the years; there is a
separation in administration of the Sherman Act, the tax system,
and customs law135 without a "breakdown." A second reason, the
alleged harm to "informal settlements," has earlier been discussed.
Then, too, it was asserted that interpretations of vague statutes
should "not have to be evolved by a series of litigations."136 Yet
this, Mr. Kintner claims, remains- after 46 years- the principal
task of the Commission.137 These alleged evils which would flow
from a separation of adjudication from prosecution are, to my
mi~d, as nothing compared to those that obtain under the present
union.
To suggest that the transfer of this one adjudicatory function
will "destroy" the FTC138 is to indulge in hyperbole. There will
remain, first, its rule-making power, whereby it can maintain its
grip on "policy" making.139 Rules have the force of law if within
the statute and in cases of doubt carry great weight as administrative interpretations. Second, the Commission will be freed for the
task of vigorous investigation and enforcement; and the possibility
of overlooking important enforcement problems, as in the case of
the recent deceptive television "quiz programs,"140 will be diminished. Third, it will be freer to undertake economic surveys and
to educate the American businessman, tasks that were originally
deemed of utmost importance.141 Fourth, it can devote more time
to developing the usefulness of its trade conferences. Fifth, it can
make more meaningful recommendations for legislation to the
Congress. And last, it can take a much more vital role in the selec135Id. at 206-07.
136 Id. at 59.
137 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 970-71.
138 Note 6 supra.
139 Sellers, The Administrative Court Proposal - or

Should Judicial Functions of Administrative Agencies Be Transferred to an Administrative Court, 23 D.C. B.A.J. 703, 708
(1956). Compare the effect given by the courts to regulations of the Internal Revenue
Service.
140 The House Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight recently reported that it "cannot
Tefrain from noting the opportunity which the FTC had in this [an early FTC] investigation to expose the whole sordid hoax of the rigged television quiz shows" (p. 27), and that
in its opinion the FTC "had ample authority to proceed against the marketing and use of
rigged television quiz show programs as a deceptive business practice within the meaning
-of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." H.R. REP. No. 1258, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., Feb. 9, 1960, p. 29. See also ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON DECEP•
TIVE PRACTICES IN BROADCASTING MEDIA, Dec. 30, 1959, pp. 4-5, 14-15, 37-42. Note too that "A
Senate Banking sub-committee has discovered that the Federal Trade Commission is not
policing widespread use of 'deceptive and misleading' advertising of credit terms on instalment sales. . • • The FTC has ample power to regulate such 'misleading' advertising of
-credit terms." Washington Daily News, April 25, 1960, p. 26.
141 See note 91 supra.
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tion, preparation and prosecution of cases, thereby exerting a powerful influence on their decision by the Trade Court and on the
continuity of its "policy." Thus, far from being "destroyed" by
the removal of one function - adjudication, the Commission will
be better able to perform all of its remaining and important
functions.
Mr. Kintner challenges us to point out "real, not imagined,
-defects in the functioning of the administrative agencies as they are
now constituted."142 It is not easy to get behind the scenes for a
glimpse of how administrative adjudication "really" functions. We
are indebted to Louis Hector for one such glimpse.143 Proceeding
without the benefit of a similar glimpse at the "dark side" of the
FTC moon,144 it is yet a "real defect" that Mr. Kintner should be
under the need of brandishing the "weapons" of the Commission
before the business community as a prelude to adjudicating whether
those "weapons" were properly employed.145 It is a defect that
there remains grave doubt whether the "separation of functions"
really insures dispassionate adjudication, that the FTC should too
easily identify the case for the prosecution, as in Carnation, with
the "public interest." It is a defect that charges should continue
to be aired that administrative tribunals hear ex parte representations respecting pending adjudicatory matters and that Congressmen, Senators and others seek to influence such adjudication.
Would a court "be free of the defects?" asks Mr. Kintner.146
What Congressman in his senses would dare to call a judge with
the object of influencing his decision? The impartiality of a court
would be unclouded by charges that its mind was "irrevocably
closed" by virtue of investigatory reports submitted by it to Congress.146• No court would be under the necessity of evangelizing with
respect to enforcement programs that would come before it for
adjudication. It would not be under suspicion of being unduly
influenced by vigorous prosecuting and investigation divisions, or
for releasing the prosecution from a stipulation merely to advance
its cause. These may not constitute "real defects" in the eyes of Mr.
Kintner, but they are "real" enough to those who seek fair play
before administrative tribunals.
Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 968-69.
note 51 supra.
144 Cf. Beelar, The Dark Side of Agency Litigation, 12 AD. L.
145 Supra, p. 209.
146 Kintner, Current Ordeal, supra note 2, at 969.
146• See note 50 supra.
142

143 See

BULL.

34 (1959).
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Conclusion
Confidence in the "unbiased" judgment of our adjudicatory
tribunals is an indispensable bastion of our form of government.147
Chairman Leedom of the NLRB recently stated that "courts do
have a public respect that agencies lack and must acquire.''148 If
the FTC has been unable in 46 years to win such confidence, we
may justifiably ask, why not. And the answer may in great part
lie in the fact that the FTC is trying to accomplish divergent, basically incompatible tasks, tasks which no amount of paper "separation" can reconcile, and which should be once more divorced if
only to preserve confidence in our adjudicatory processes.
In truth, it is idle to expect impartiality of an agency that is
directed to effectuate a policy. If genuine impartiality is desired,
adjudication must then be placed outside the agency, for agency
adjudication can offer no more than the semblance of impartiality.
This is the nub of the Sir Oliver Franks' Committee's recent report
to Parliament:
"[W]hen Parliament sets up a tribunal to decide cases, the adjudication is placed outside the Department concerned. The
members of the tribunal are neutral and impartial in relation
to the policy of the Minister, except insofar as that policy is
contained in the rules which the tribunal has been set up to
apply. But the minister, deciding in the cases [left to him to
decide], is committed to a policy which he has been charged
by Parliament to carry out. In this sense he is not, and cannot
be, impartial.''149
Whether certain exigencies may require agency adjudication of
policy at all costs may be left for future examination. The Trade
Court proposal is aimed at the situation where a prosecutor charges
law violation which he is now required to judge, the classic situation for impartial adjudication.
147 "In this country government rests fundamentally upon the consent of the governed. The general acceptability of these adjudications is one of the vital elements in
sustaining that consent." REPORT OF THE [Sir Oliver Franks] COMMITI'EE ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAIS AND ENQUIRIES 5 (1957). Quoted in Veterans Affairs Report, supra note 5,
at 5.
148 Speech, December 13, 1957. Attorney General Rogers recently said, "There should
be in every instance the same public confidence in the integrity and fairness of administrative proceedings as court proceedings now enjoy," implying that agencies do not now
enjoy such confidence. Supra note I.
149 Supra note 147, at 5. The Lord Sankey Committee said, "It is unfair to impose
on a practical administrator the duty of adjudicating in any matter in which it could be
fairly argued that his impartiality would be in inverse ratio to his strength and ability
as a Minister." Supra note 28, at 78,
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The Trade Court bill is a modest, empirical approach to what,
despite the "separation of functions," remains an "acute problem."
It singles out an unquestionably judicial function, determination
in an adversary proceeding whether there has been violation of an
existing law, culminating in issuance of a cease-and-desist order
which is like an injunction in nature and a familiar staple of the
courts. It does not represent a sharp breach with a long-established
tradition but rather a return thereto after an experimental, unstudied and comparatively recent departure. If the Trade Court
proves meritorious, we can profit by its example; if it fails, it can
be abandoned. It "is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system," said Justice Brandeis, that a "single courageous State" may
try "novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country."150 Bearing in mind also the successful example
of the Tax Court and the Customs Court, it cannot be that the
return of adjudicatory functions from one federal agency or two
to an administrative court would "scuttle the entire administrative
process."
1110 New

State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion, Stone,

J., concurring).
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Judge Friendly's recent article, "A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, " 151 came to my attention as my o·wn was in
galley, too late to incorporate comment thereon in the body. Although he modestly points out that he is a "new judge," speaking
from the "vantage point of six months," 152 his standing as a veteran
practitioner before CAB lends special weight to his views.
Judge Friendly fears that the proposal to separate the adjudicatory from the policy-making function "would destroy what is
one of the greatest merits of the administrative agency, its combination of legislative, executive, and judicial attributes." 153 By way
of illustration, Judge Friendly says it "would deprive the public
of the benefits of the very expertise that is a principal raison d'etre
of the regulatory agency."154 Students of the administrative process
increasingly view this "expertise" as a delusion; 155 and administrative courts can become at least as expert as administrators, witness
the Tax Court. Aware of the increasing premature rotation of
agency members, Judge Friendly suggests that their terms be
lengthened to ten years.156 Even if the lengthened term should fortify agency members against the siren calls of business or private
practice, it will yet not remove the competing administrative pressures arising from a multiplicity of duties which constrain agency
members to rely on institutional decisions, a prime source of dissatisfaction with agency adjudication.157 It will not insulate adjudication from the incompatible prosecuting function, 158 nor will
it erase from the minds of the administrative adjudicators the
policy that they pressed upon an industry before they sat in judgment on a dissenter from that policy.159 And it will not satisfactorily insulate the agency members from external pressures.
Judge Friendly's second objection to an administrative court
is that the "line between policy making and adjudication is altogether too shadowy to afford a basis for separation."160 If this
151 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 429 (1960).
at 429.
at 441
at 442; and seep. 443.
155 Supra, p. 211.
156 Supra note 151, at 445.
157 Supra, p. 215.
158 Supra, pp. 206-11.
159 Supra note 51.
160 Supra note 151, at 441.
152Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.

TRADE COURT:

A

REPLY TO MR. KINTNER

231

means that policy making is not for courts, there are many areas
in which they make policy; for example, they have been making
policy within the vague confines of the antitrust laws for sixty
years. Indeed there are those who prefer that "judges rather than
commissioners should shape the large outlines of our economic
policy, where Congress has not stated its will." 161 The joint administration of the Sherman Act by the courts and the Department of Justice, and of the tax laws by the Tax Court and the
Internal Revenue Service, indicate that administrative policy making is not hamstrung by judicial participation. If policy making
by administrators is to be preferred because it is they who are
responsible for carrying out the entire "program," I suggest that
it is precisely this identification with the "program" which renders
impartial administrative adjudication difficult, if not virtually impossible.1 62
Moreover, Hector has given evidence of a break-down of adjudicatory policy-making, which is not confined to CAB.163 If we
free the commissioners from an uncongenial, burdensome, and
inadequately performed judicial task, they can the better concentrate upon their legislative task - the formulation of policy. The
agency can then retain control over policy through the formulation
of rules164 which, if within the statutory authorization, are binding
upon the court. And the administrative court can undertake the
case-to-case formulation of policy that is now neglected.
I would not suggest that the problem of separating the adjudicatory function from the other administrative functions in ratemaking cases is of the same order as the simpler FTC issuance of
a complaint that the law is being violated. But even though, as
Judge Friendly states, the "fixing of future rates is surely not a
'judicial' function,'' 165 for which reason it may not be confided to
a "constitutional," Article III court, it does not follow that such
functions cannot be assigned to a "legislative" court. The Tax
Court furnishes an example of one such court; the Court of Claims
101 Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REv. 436, 473 (1954).
102 Supra, pp. 204-06, 228.
103 Supra, pp. 215-16.
164Supra, p. 226. If NLRB v. Mountain Pacific Chapter, 270 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1959}
intimates, with respect to union-operated hiring halls, that this is "the type of thing that
agencies with expert knowledge ought to do," as Judge Friendly states, supra note 151, at
442, it is worth noting that the same 9th Circuit later suggested that the APA rule-making
procedures would have been better suited to the problem than adjudication. NLRB v.
E 8: B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594, 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1960).
105 Supra note 151, at 442.
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and Courts of Customs began as "legislative" courts. The object
of the separation, as in the case of the Tax Court, would be to secure
impartial adjudication, although I am not without further study
prepared to say that such separation in rate-making cases is either
necessary or desirable.
Finally, Judge Friendly, in connection with "unfair labor practices" adverts to the possibility that an administrative court would
impose "ineffective remedies [which] could effectively frustrate
policy, whereas by imposing penalties out of relation to the crime
it might build up resentments which would lead to a demand for
legislative change that a more expert administrator would have
avoided."166 Courts employ a very wide discretion in formulating
antitrust decrees,167 and such decrees have yet to breed the "resentment" which led to abridgment of the powers of those "expert
administrators," the NLRB, by the Taft-Hartley laws and the institution of a separate office of General Counsel.
166Jd. at 443.
167 Besser Manufacturing

Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 449 (1952). Professor Oppenheim states: "The difficulties of formulating an effective decree in complex anti-trust
cases often involving the complex structure of the entire industry are obviously enormous."
OPPENHEIM, CAsES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRusr LA.ws 886 (1948).

